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Resources Planning Board, 
coined a term which is 
emblematic of this whole 
development. The proper 
object of politics, he wrote, 
was no longer ‘the art of the 
traditional’ but ‘the science 
of constructive social control’ 
(quoted in Marini, 2001, 29). 
At least until very recently, the 
resulting confidence about the ability 
to control the future persisted, despite 
the decidedly mixed success of 
government-led initiatives. During the 
same period, however, perceptions in 
non-governmental domains, beginning 
in philosophy and the natural sciences, 
had come increasingly to stress the 
unpredictability and contingency of 
future events and to express scepticism 
about the possibility of managing them. 
In fact, such ‘post-Newtonian’ perceptions 
can be said to have preceded the turn to 
intensive planning I have been referring 
to (e.g. William James, Bergson, the later 
Whitehead, and Heidegger in philosophy; 
A strong focus in political and policy circles on ‘managing’ 
the future – most visible during the latter half of last century 
in tools and techniques of central and strategic planning – 
was itself the outcome of an explosion of interest, dating 
from the beginning of that century, in the idea of establishing 
a science of administration. This idea was in turn related to 
the burgeoning throughout the 19th century of the social 
sciences, and of ‘governmentality’ in general (Wallerstein, 
1991; Dean, 1999). In the early 1900s, Charles Merriam, a 
political scientist who later headed the United States National 
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Heisenberg in physics), although it is only 
in the last decade or so that they have come 
to be more widely influential in policy 
circles through the importation from the 
natural sciences of theories associated 
with ‘complexity’ and ‘emergence’ (e.g. 
Morcol, 2002) and a corresponding 
increase of interest in matters of process, 
timing and timeliness. 
An important and largely unexplored 
question raised by these developments 
concerns the embedded capacities or 
entailments of the tools used by government 
to intervene in and attempt to manage 
the future. Specifically for my purposes, 
what presuppositions (no doubt largely 
unconscious) about ‘time’ are implied in 
or built into the design and functioning 
of these instruments and techniques? 
And further, what can consideration of 
this embedded temporality in relation to 
a contemporary privileging of dynamic 
complexity tell us about how effective 
the tools are likely to be? In the context 
of New Zealand history of the last 50 
years (a context not dissimilar to that of 
other Western countries), such tools – 
broadly conceived to include techniques 
of social mediation – prominently, and to 
a certain extent chronologically, include 
(1) the use of national conferences to 
enlist expertise and secure consensus over 
future direction; (2) the use of computer-
simulated economic modelling and 
forecasting; (3) the application of ‘free-
market’ theories to economic and social 
management; and (4) the techniques of 
scenario construction. 
My aim in this short article, drawing 
on my recently published book Governing 
the Future (Common Ground, 2011), 
is to illustrate the theme of embedded 
temporality just referred to by considering 
in turn, and to some extent evaluating, 
each of the exemplary tools and 
procedures listed above. Each, it can be 
noted, while continuing to have possible 
application today, is also paradigmatic of 
a particular period (its heyday, as it were) 
within the time span addressed here. It 
might even be argued in some cases that 
a tool was – in part – a response to the 
perceived shortcomings of a previous 
paradigm; but in suggesting this I do 
not mean to suggest that the tools have 
a similar scale or scope. It is rather that 
each might be regarded as a reflection 
of an emphasis or understanding having 
particular resonance at a certain date. 
Moreover, they have in common the fact 
that they have all been recruited for the 
purpose of providing access to the ‘big 
picture’.
I also need to make clear at the outset 
that I do not believe I am succumbing 
to a technological determinism whereby 
human activity is held to be wholly 
dictated by the capacities of available 
tools. Yet nor do I want to revert to an 
opposing instrumentalist view of seeing 
tools as neutral and freely adaptable aids 
to human rationality. The more nuanced 
approach I am taking here is summed 
up by Andrew Feenberg when he writes: 
‘What human beings are and will become 
is decided in the shape of our tools no 
less than in the actions of statesmen 
and political movements. The design of 
technology is thus an ontological decision 
fraught with political consequences’ (1991, 
3; italics added). I also wish to leave room 
for an understanding of the completely 
pervasive and unavoidable inter-
implication of humans and technology, 
broadly conceived, as distinct from the 
‘take it or leave it’ attitudes towards 
technology that remain characteristic 
of much thinking today. A brilliant 
exposition of the complex issues involved 
in this ‘co-constitution’ of technology 
and the human, with particular reference 
to language and contemporary digital 
media, can be found in Frabetti (2011).
Conditions of compatibility
Given a world resembling contemporary 
accounts of complexity and emergence, 
what should an effective future-
management tool (if such is possible) 
be able to take account of? This is a 
world which, according to Ilya Prigogine 
(2001), moves very far from equilibrium 
as a result of the unpredictability of the 
movement of matter. It is a world which 
is forever in a process of becoming rather 
than a world of merely aggregative change 
from a stable or mature base. When we 
expand this conceptualisation from the 
physical sciences to include the human 
social world, we are faced with a ‘spatio-
temporal structure’ (Prigogine’s term), 
in which human action arises out of 
a horizon of expectation in interaction 
with a space of experience – the terms are 
Reinhart Koselleck’s (in Ricoeur, 1994, 
10-15). In other words, our temporal 
orientation is inseparable from the ever-
shifting social, physical and psychological 
arrangements in space (of bodies, objects, 
emotions, thoughts) that we remember, 
perceive and, not least, imagine. 
Very briefly, then, a tool that was equal 
to socio-environmental complexity would 
have to expect the unexpected. It would 
have to be able to take account of human 
goals and anticipations, not just known 
(or typical) actions. It would need to take 
account of developmental dynamics and 
processes, but resist the temptation to the 
teleological. It would need to make room 
for the broadest possible contextualisation 
of events and actions.
Conferencing
The value accorded to conferencing is 
grounded above all in the desire to allow, 
in spatio-temporal terms, the more or 
less simultaneous laying out of all the 
relevant viewpoints, with the hope that 
such airing will lead to rational discussion 
and eventual consensus. It is based on the 
assumption that, in Habermas’s words, ‘the 
parties are oriented towards agreement 
and not just towards their own respective 
success’ (Habermas, 1983, 173, emphasis 
added). In historical terms, it is a technique 
particularly suited to the ‘corporate’ 
administration of the economy that was 
popular in many capitalist countries in the 
1960s, in which it is assumed that society 
What human beings  
are and will become  
is decided in the shape  
of our tools no less  
than in the actions  
of statesmen and 
political movements.
Page 54 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 8, Issue 1 – February 2012
can be fully represented by capital, labour 
and government, but which also bears 
similarity, as Bevir (2006) points out, to 
contemporary ‘system governance’. 
In the New Zealand post-war context, 
this recipe for achieving consensus 
was inaugurated by the Industrial 
Development Conference, organised 
by the Department of Industries and 
Commerce and held in June 1960. Very 
briefly, its purpose was to establish an 
agreed direction for diversifying the 
New Zealand economy away from its 
dependence on primary agricultural 
products (wool, butter, meat carcasses, 
etc.). The conference opened with plenary 
addresses from the prime minister, Walter 
Nash, the head of the Department of 
Industries and Commerce, W.B. Sutch, 
and the farmers’ official representative, 
W.P. O’Shea. The gesture of inclusion 
towards the farmers, as the dominant 
force in economic production, backfired. 
O’Shea used his centre-stage opportunity 
to tell the exact opposite story to the one 
the government was trying to have heard: 
he claimed that if the farmers were only 
given enough resources, they could solve 
New Zealand’s economic problems all by 
themselves – i.e. by producing more of 
the same – for as long as anyone present 
was likely to be interested in the matter. 
The conference proceedings 
(Department of Industries and Commerce, 
1960) do not provide any certain evidence 
that these contradictions were exposed 
and explicitly discussed. Hence, although 
the conference concluded on a consensual 
note, it illustrated the Achilles’ heel of 
the technique: there is not much it can 
do if the primary objective of one or 
more of the participants is, contrary to 
the condition identified by Habermas, to 
express and defend its own interests. This 
is a common pattern with representational 
conferences predicated on faith in rational 
communication: what is expressed 
assertively is received politely, rather 
than with agonistic critique or concerted 
debate, and the result is typically an 
unchallenged disjunction of perspectives. 
The original problem the conference has 
been called to address is temporarily 
covered over by the bonhomie with which 
such events conventionally conclude, only 
to resurface later.
Another notable feature of 
conferencing in general – one that 
continues to be particularly familiar in an 
academic context – is the division of the 
given time into, on the one hand, plenary 
sessions that all can attend, and on the 
other, parallel sessions that participants 
must choose between. The variation on 
this idea in the political context of the 
1960 conference was the establishment 
of a committee structure whereby the 
main business of the conference was 
allocated to independent groups working 
simultaneously on their allocated areas 
of responsibility. One group was charged 
with exploring and reporting on external 
influences on the New Zealand economy, 
while another addressed internal 
considerations; one group focused on 
natural resources in isolation from 
another discussing human resources. 
The divisions imposed by this 
process are sufficiently suspect as to have 
rendered the proceedings problematic 
in advance. The main assumption 
informing this method of operating is 
that these are autonomous tasks that can 
be allocated simultaneously to separate 
– but implicitly homogeneous – groups 
and the results subsequently collated 
without the need for considering how 
the different and deviating dynamics 
and discussion trajectories of the groups 
(the temporal aspect) might affect 
the compatibility of their individual 
results. Within each group or domain 
of responsibility, discussion will stop 
short of discussing fully what would be 
better treated as a set of interrelations 
(the spatial aspect). (This still happens 
today in problem-oriented conferencing 
through the habit of instigating break-
out groups; the technique can work 
if the subsequent reporting back and 
discussion is extensive, but all too often 
it isn’t.) The image this practice brings to 
mind – a machine taken apart, worked 
on, and then put together again without 
any loss – is entirely consistent, of course, 
with the Newtonian engineering ethos 
(technical, rational, instrumental) that 
went virtually unquestioned in the 1960s 
and remains not unusual today.
What a dynamic temporal perspective 
allows us to see is that the problem 
with consensus-building as it was and 
sometimes still is envisaged, and as it 
was typically enacted in and encouraged 
by the conference technique of full 
representation of competing interests, 
is not the pursuit of consensus per se 
(that is crucially necessary work in 
social formation and maintenance), 
but rather the tendency to see national 
unity or full representation (and hence 
coordination) as something that can or 
should be achievable all at once. This is 
arguably too static and overly utopian an 
expectation, particularly in contemporary 
multicultural societies. National unity 
and consensus is achievable, but not 
when – as is conventionally the case – it 
is conceptualised in exclusively socio-
structural or spatial (i.e., a-temporal) 
terms. In a view based on a strongly 
contingent emergence, the best that can 
be aimed for realistically is an historical 
unity; one which is registered only in the 
continuing existence of a given nation 
despite the periodic rifts and clashes that 
threaten it, and which requires ceaseless 
maintenance work on the part of 
government in order to settle temporarily 
the grievances that the maintenance 
process imposes cyclically on one group 
after another.
This is not to suggest ruling out 
conferencing as a decision-enabling 
procedure, but to recognise the over-
privileging of immediacy and inclusivity 
National unity and 
consensus is achievable, 
but not when – as is 
conventionally the case 
– it is conceptualised 
in exclusively socio-
structural or spatial  
(i.e., a-temporal)  
terms.
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that the technique can encourage. 
Conferencing, to be effective now, would 
arguably also need to be employed much 
more regularly than it has been in New 
Zealand since its heyday in the 1960s, 
so that an appropriate model can be 
progressively built.
Economic modelling
The National Development Council 
system, established in the late 1960s, was the 
product of a further national conferencing 
exercise. The council and its satellite 
sectoral committees (again recalling 
a Newtonian mechanical universe) 
provided the institutional arrangements 
for gathering data from all sectors of the 
economy and setting targets for future 
output. A vital tool for the management 
of this process was the computerised 
model of the economy, a tool which, over 
the years, has been subjected to the kind 
of critique and refinement that resonates 
with, but can be further illuminated by, an 
analysis of embedded temporality. 
Bryan Philpott became the leading 
New Zealand exponent of econometric 
modelling, beginning his work at Lincoln 
University in Canterbury, before moving 
to Victoria University of Wellington. 
Here is a brief account of his project, as 
described later by the Task Force on Social 
and Economic Planning in its report, New 
Zealand at the Turning Point:
to produce an economic model 
which could be used to assess 
where the economy was heading 
on current trends, what it could 
feasibly or optimally achieve and 
what were the policy implications of 
the optimum blueprint. The model 
attempted to take account of the 
complex interdependencies among 
different sectors of the economy, and 
alternative assumptions that could 
be made about important factors in 
development such as the terms of 
trade, likely trends in productivity, 
ratio of savings to national income 
and the like. (Task Force on Social 
and Economic Planning, 1976, 12)
It must be acknowledged immediately 
that, while the description states that 
the model is based on extrapolation of 
current trends, an important qualification 
appears nevertheless to be implicit in the 
wording: it is not necessarily assumed that 
current trends will continue, merely that a 
certain outcome can be predicted if they 
do. And yet, even with this qualification 
there remained, at the time, confidence 
in the ability of research to separate out 
and establish the causes of the various 
dynamics, as well as to quantify the 
sequential logic of their combination. 
To this extent, and to the extent that the 
complexities of human response are absent 
from the model, the work does not depart 
from the reductionism of mechanistic 
Newtonian science. In other words, while 
such models (i.e. as were operative in the 
1970s) can perform complex calculations, 
they are still essentially ‘additive’ or ‘linear’: 
the results are derived entirely from – or 
reducible to – the combination of the 
numerical components fed into the model 
by the analyst or forecaster. By contrast, in 
a non-reductive account – one informed 
by complexity or emergence theory, for 
example – the modeler would have to 
take into account that the results are not 
simply cumulative, but that any variation 
or deviation in the values given to the 
individual elements will, in combination, 
ramify unpredictably throughout the 
whole. In the modellers’ own terms, it 
is the problem – never fully solved – of 
allowing for what came to be known, 
following criticism of the extrapolation 
basis of the earlier models, as ‘cointegrated 
variables’.
In Philpott’s (1971, 11) terms, 
considered in relation to the spatio-
temporal foundations of emergence theory 
(Prigogine, 2001), this representational 
and extrapolating technology is, as he 
himself put it, ‘coherent-rational’: that 
is, it fits logically together (space) while 
obeying a logical sequence of operations 
(time). The difficulty with it stems from 
the presumption that the temporality of 
the economy can be accounted for by a 
strictly causal sequence. 
The market mechanism
The faith in the ability of the state to 
determine, by comprehensive planning, 
a bountiful future, a faith that prevailed 
amongst societies of every ideological 
stripe in the 1950s and 60s, came to be 
contested by the undercurrent of ‘free 
market’ or ‘neo-liberal’ ideology that 
gradually rose to prominence in Western 
countries in the late 1970s and 80s. The 
failures of modelling in the early 1970s in 
the wake of major economic turbulence 
undoubtedly contributed in some part to 
this development. There can be no doubt 
that if it worked according to theory, 
the market would be the instrument 
of dynamic temporal management par 
excellence. In its radical form, the idea was 
that if the autonomous individual, who is 
supposedly possessed of full information 
– or at least the same information as 
every other functional individual – makes 
rational choices based on long-term self-
interest, the resulting aggregated decisions 
of supply and demand would be the 
best possible outcome for everybody. 
This market situation, constantly 
evolving according to unpredictable new 
combinations and interactions, is ‘free’ in 
the sense of being open to change – in the 
last analysis ‘emergent’, i.e., undeterminable 
by external forces alone. In practice, of 
course, as has been well documented, the 
results are destructive for a good many 
of the human participants, as well as for 
the environment, perhaps because, as 
William Connolly (2011, 37) points out, 
the market cannot operate in isolation 
from potentially destabilising interactions 
with innumerable other systems or fields 
of force. The market cannot embrace, 
much as its advocates would like it to, 
the totality and variability of human 
The market cannot 
embrace, much as its 
advocates would like 
it to, the totality and 
variability of human 
activity, including its 
inconsistency and 
irrationality. 
Page 56 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 8, Issue 1 – February 2012
activity, including its inconsistency and 
irrationality.
It is popularly believed that the New 
Zealand Treasury adopted this free market 
conception as part of its ‘reform’ of the 
economy in the 1980s. A fierce critic of 
neo-liberalism, Jane Kelsey, in Reclaiming 
the Future, provides a typical expression 
of the charge:
The ‘fundamentals’ of the New 
Zealand Experiment – a deregulated 
labour market, a minimalist 
government, a strict monetarist policy, 
the liberalisation of trade, investment 
and markets, and fiscal restraint – 
comprise an ideologically coherent 
package that is premised on unfettered 
market forces and a limited state. 
(Kelsey, 1999, 29; emphasis added)
However, I would argue that the 
Treasury did not embrace the free 
market to the extent commonly believed. 
Although clearly wary of planning, the 
Treasury appears to have conceived of 
intervention as an essential aspect of a 
market-based future-management tool 
that governments have at their disposal. 
Here is the Treasury ‘market’ view, from 
Economic Management, briefing for the 
newly-elected Labour government of 
1984:
The most obvious body to fulfill the 
role of ‘setting the rules of the game’ 
and ensuring that they are followed 
is the Government. In a sense, then, 
all markets can be thought of as 
having a label attached reading ‘made 
by Government’. Viewed in this way, 
it does not make sense to treat ‘free’ 
markets as being at one end of a 
continuum which ranges from no 
government involvement to complete 
government control. Since a decision 
not to interfere with the operation of 
an existing market is then equivalent 
to allowing a given set of interventions 
to stand, it is more useful to consider 
the question ‘what set of interventions 
is most appropriate?’ than to attempt 
to answer those of the form ‘should 
the Government intervene?’ In any 
particular intervention decision, 
therefore, the extent to which market 
forces are utilised is a matter related 
primarily to the process by which an 
objective may be achieved rather than 
an objective in itself. (New Zealand 
Treasury, 1984, 296)
This prescription strikes me as more 
consistent with what government did in 
the 1980s than was popularly believed at 
the time. Arguably, it shows a degree of 
sensitivity to what is required of political 
institutions and practices if the objective 
is to sustain a market system in the face 
of an unpredictable future and volatile 
human response; and as such is consistent 
with emergence theory, which, when 
translated to the realm of human action, 
suggests a policy of minimal guidance, 
of seeding and strategic nudging which 
will vary in intensity according to the 
demands of the moment (‘what set of 
interventions is most appropriate’). If the 
word ‘appropriate’ in relation to market 
intervention means we can understand 
governments to be endorsing a policy of 
timely and short-term adjustments, then 
there is a clear resonance with descriptions 
of emergent or complex adaptive systems 
such as that provided by Stacey (1996, 
87): ‘because complex adaptive systems 
are the product of their precise history, 
and because it takes time for small 
changes to escalate in such systems, their 
short-term behavior is predictable’. That 
said, it should also be noted that this 
interpretation of temporality-informed 
market action still leaves ample room for 
criticism of what the Treasury judged to 
be an ‘appropriate’ level of intervention 
during the period in question.
Scenario construction
In the process labelled ‘foresight’, popular 
with many governments in the 1990s, 
and in part a response to recent market 
failures, we have the potential for a 
radical departure from previous attempts 
to manage the future, and one which 
no doubt was connected also to the 
contemporaneous ideas of ‘reinventing 
government’ and renewing the ‘purposive 
state’ (Spicer, 2004). Instead of analysing 
trends or setting targets based largely on 
extrapolation from the present, or even, 
as in the case of the Treasury, correcting 
divergences from an established or 
preferred setting – a practice which 
arguably still assumes an overly linear 
understanding of change – we have 
in foresight the idea of envisioning a 
possible desirable state of things and then 
developing a strategy for achieving it 
(sometimes referred to as ‘backcasting’, as 
distinct from forecasting). Or, alternatively, 
we have the notion of positing a range of 
equally plausible futures out of which 
particular possibilities can be aimed at, 
encouraged, resisted or prepared for. In 
either case there is an assumption that 
the present, while it may not be fully 
understandable, is open and malleable to 
a degree that at least potentially outweighs 
those aspects which are determining. 
The key point of interest for 
continuing innovation in foresight-
related planning, and for research on 
temporality in government, arising from 
New Zealand’s experience at that time 
was the development and publicising of a 
set of contrasting ‘national scenarios’ of a 
possible future. In socio-temporal terms, 
the use of alternative scenarios suggests 
acceptance of a more open future than 
was apparent in earlier initiatives, and, 
moreover, potentially signifies a decisive 
break from the dubious temporal ideology 
of economic development, i.e., from 
development understood teleologically as 
In the process labelled 
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... what I have offered 
in focusing sharply on 
embedded temporality  
is ... a particularly 
relevant addition to  
the methods for 
conducting critique 
of policy development 
instruments as they 
emerge. 
either a logical destination or a progressive 
fulfilment. Unfortunately, the national 
scenarios produced by the Ministry of 
Research, Science and Technology (1997) 
during the early stages of what came 
to be known as the Foresight Project 
were rather too technically undeveloped 
to live up to the promise of the idea. 
However, I want to reflect more closely 
on whether scenario construction as a 
tool for managing the future could in 
principle be compatible with a temporal 
outlook consistent with complexity and 
emergence. 
There is a fair degree of consensus in 
the literature on scenarios (e.g., Fahey 
and Randall, 1998; Staley, 2002; see also 
Bishop et al., 2007 for a comprehensive 
comparative survey) as to the main 
characteristics of a good set of scenarios:
1. All alternative futures represented in 
a set of scenarios must be plausible 
while at the same time clearly 
contrasting with each other. None 
should be wholly good or wholly 
bad. All should include attractive 
elements and be presented positively, 
which means, most importantly, that 
they are capable of enabling genuine 
dialogue and exploration of future 
possibilities to take place around 
them, independently of whether any 
‘choice’ will eventually be made. 
2. A set of scenarios should not fall into 
an identifiable pattern of comparative 
likelihood or impact. As scenario-
design experts Peter Schwarz and 
James Ogilvy (1998, 78) express it: 
‘beware the ‘middle of the road’ 
approach trap – that is, selecting three 
scenarios that offer ‘large, medium, 
and small’ versions of the future. Too 
often, managers will be tempted to 
identify one of the three – usually the 
middle version – as the most likely 
scenario. Such simplistic scenarios 
don’t challenge the preconceptions 
of the decision makers; neither do 
they provoke managers to imagine 
innovative strategic options and their 
implications. When presented with 
large, medium, and small scenarios, 
managers have a tendency to treat the 
most likely scenario as a prediction, 
thus failing to explore the other 
scenarios fully.’
3. The main ‘key drivers’ (i.e. known 
environmental, institutional and 
cultural forces and trends, such as 
globalisation, population ageing, or 
climate change) should be invariably 
present – although given variable 
weightings – across all scenarios. 
The best approach is to make a small 
selection of those drivers whose 
presence is to be expected but where 
there is currently much uncertainty 
as to what their actual impact will 
be. Scenario-building, in line with an 
understanding of emergence theory, 
gains more value from exploring how 
the same base (or ‘matrix’) of drivers or 
conditions might play out differently 
according to the different intensities 
or combinations experimented with 
across a scenario set.
4. Scenarios should be realistic, in the 
sense of fleshed out with details. They 
should make good use of invented 
historical detail showing how the 
situation depicted could have come 
about, allowing a reader to enter into 
and explore the picture of the future 
being offered.
This matrix method of scenario 
formation, if carried out in accordance 
with the above prescription, is surely 
consistent with current conceptions 
concerning the nature of change and 
how it can be influenced. Specifically, 
the method overtly recognises the fact 
that particular determinants can play 
out very unpredictably. It also allows 
the variety and variability of human 
perceptions and attitudinal responses to 
be taken into account more readily than 
economic modelling does. Arguably, 
however, scenarios produced according to 
the techniques described above draw too 
heavily and exclusively on memory, that is, 
on people’s sense of the established forces 
informing the present (the ‘drivers’), and 
not enough on alternative dreams or 
purposes. In this respect, an alternative 
and popular conception of scenarios – 
the free envisioning of a desirable future 
that I mentioned earlier – offers a possible 
corrective, although these typically go 
too far in the opposite direction, not 
being sufficiently anchored in the drivers. 
Certainly, the two approaches to scenario 
formation can’t easily be combined (I 
attempt to do so in the final chapter of 
Governing the Future, but there is not the 
space to discuss that here). Even so, of 
the techniques discussed in this article, 
scenario construction seems clearly to be 
the one most suited to the understanding 
of temporality that I have been favouring. 
And therefore it is regrettable that more 
attention has not been paid to this 
technique since the Foresight Project was 
abandoned in 1999.
Conclusion
The governmental tools I have been 
discussing have not, of course, gone 
unquestioned before now. However, 
what I have offered in focusing sharply 
on embedded temporality is, I hope, 
a particularly relevant addition to the 
methods for conducting critique of policy 
development instruments as they emerge. 
I want to reiterate that the temporal 
commitments associated with these, or 
any other, techniques are not necessarily 
locked in or resistant to modification 
(as a technological determinism would 
have it); nevertheless, design and the 
expectation deriving from initial use 
will together establish a trajectory of 
application (a ‘destiny’, as it is sometimes 
evocatively said) that can easily assume 
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permanence if not consciously reflected 
upon. Nor should it be supposed that I 
am advocating the avoidance of any of 
the tools discussed above. Indeed, I would 
argue that governments should be bold 
enough to continue employing these sorts 
of big-picture initiatives, but that they 
should be used in an integrated manner 
(e.g. Fontela, 2000), as part of an overall 
strategy for thinking about and managing 
the future. However, the last few years 
have not been encouraging in this regard.
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